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Autism has for many years been diagnosed on the basis of 
the characteristic ‘triad’ of impairments: social deficits, 
communicative impairments and restricted and repeti-
tive behaviours and interests (RRBIs) (World Health 
Organization, 1992). Although the latest edition of 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(5th ed.; DSM-5) (American Psychiatric Association 
(APA), 2013) collapses social and communication symp-
toms into one domain (further discussed below), deficits 
across the three areas of the triad are still required for a 
diagnosis of ‘autism spectrum disorder (ASD)’. Wing and 
Gould (1979) introduced the concept of the triad of impair-
ments after finding that children with social impairments 
often exhibited communication deficits and impoverished 
imaginative play, with repetitive stereotyped behaviour.
Based on Wing and Gould’s epidemiological data, it has 
long been assumed that the behavioural symptoms of ASD 
have common causes at the genetic, cognitive and neural 
levels. However, Wing and Gould (1979) themselves noted 
that some children presented with only certain aspects of 
the triad. More recently, it has been found that 10% of chil-
dren in the general population present with just one impair-
ment (defined as scoring in the most impaired 5%) without 
co-occurring deficits in other parts of the triad (Ronald et al., 
2006a), and modest-to-low phenotypic correlations between 
triad features have been reported in individuals with ASD 
(Dworzynski et al., 2009) and trait-wise in general popula-
tion samples (Ronald et al., 2006b). These findings have 
been taken to suggest that the triad of impairments is sepa-
rable at the behavioural level, although this has been a mat-
ter of some debate. The work by Constantino et al. (2004), 
for example, has suggested that a single factor is sufficient 
to explain variation on the Social Responsiveness Scale. 
However, more recent work by this group has supported a 
two-factor solution, distinguishing social and communica-
tive symptoms from rigid and repetitive behaviours (e.g. 
Frazier et al., 2012). In addition, twin studies have uncov-
ered the relatively independent heritability of each of the 
three impairments of the triad (Robinson et al., 2012; 
Ronald et al., 2006a, 2006b, 2011), suggesting that largely 
non-overlapping genes influence each part of the triad. 
These observations have led to the proposal of the ‘frac-
tionable’ autism triad, a theory in which the social and non-
social symptoms of ASD are suggested to have distinct 
causes at the genetic, neural, cognitive and behavioural lev-
els (Happé et al., 2006; Happé and Ronald, 2008). The pur-
pose of this article is to examine the proposal that autism is 
‘fractionable’ at the cognitive level.
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A range of cognitive accounts have been proposed to 
explain the symptoms of ASD. These theories posit a pri-
mary deficit either in the social domain (e.g. Theory of 
Mind (ToM), emotion processing and social motivation/
reward) or in the non-social domain (e.g. executive dys-
function, weak central coherence (CC) and reduced top-
down modulation). However, it is questionable whether 
any of these theories can account for the full triad of diag-
nostic features of ASD, let alone the associated features 
such as raised incidence of talents and uneven cognitive 
profile. For example, the ToM deficit hypothesis provides a 
good explanation for the social and communication impair-
ments in ASD, but struggles to explain the non-social 
domain of ASD, such as RRBIs, motor problems, sensory 
abnormalities and savant skills. Conversely, non-social 
cognitive accounts of ASD provide a good explanation for 
the non-social aspects of ASD. For example, executive dys-
function in ASD may underlie RRBIs due to a failure to 
generate new behaviours or shift set. In addition, a detail-
focused cognitive style may account for ‘insistence on 
sameness’, narrow special interests and high rates of talent 
in ASD. Neither account, however, explains the specific 
pattern of intact and impaired social cognition (for review, 
see Frith and Frith, 2010). Consequently, Happé et al. 
(2006; Happé and Ronald, 2008) proposed that multiple 
cognitive accounts may apply, each explaining different 
parts of the ASD triad. This proposal makes a number of 
predictions (e.g. no one cognitive characteristic of ASD 
need be specific to ASD), but here we will focus on just 
two: (1) that performance on social and non-social cogni-
tive tasks should be relatively unrelated and (2) that spe-
cific cognitive tests should relate differentially to distinct 
aspects of the triad of symptoms in ASD.
This article will review the evidence that cognitive func-
tions are fractioned in ASD. First, the relative independ-
ence of cognitive functions will be explored. Second, 
published studies addressing the relation between cognitive 
tasks and symptoms in ASD will be summarised. Finally, a 
multiple cognitive deficit account of ASD, incorporating 
several cognitive functions, will be suggested to provide a 
better explanation for the complete profile of ASD.
Prediction (1): relations among 
putative cognitive characteristics of 
ASD
While by no means the only cognitive theories of ASD, the 
‘Theory of Mind’ (for review, see Frith et al., 1991), 
‘Executive dysfunction’ (Hill, 2004) and ‘weak coherence’ 
(Happé and Booth, 2008; Happé and Frith, 2006) accounts 
are of sufficiently long-standing to have been examined 
empirically in relation to one another. The fractionated triad 
account proposed that these three cognitive deficits/styles 
may be relatively independent and underlie different 
impairments in ASD (Happé and Ronald, 2008). What is 
the state of the empirical evidence to date?
ToM and executive function (EF)
In contrast to the prediction that cognitive deficits are inde-
pendent, a link between ToM and EF in ASD has been 
reported. Studies with children with ASD have reported 
positive correlations between false-belief tasks testing ToM 
and tasks measuring various aspects of EF, including the 
Luria Hand Game (Bigham, 2010), the Windows task 
(Russell et al., 1991), the NEPSY Knock-Tap task (no cor-
relations with four other EF tasks; Joseph and Tager-
Flusberg, 2004), the Dimensional Change Card Sort task 
(Colvert et al., 2002; Zelazo et al., 2002), the Wisconsin 
Card Sort Task and the Tower of Hanoi (Ozonoff et al., 
1991). Ozonoff et al. (1991) found that performance on 
tasks measuring ToM and EF was related in ASD when 
controlling for IQ, although this correlation was not found 
in the control group. However, the ASD group exhibited a 
universal deficit in EF that was not apparent for ToM. 
Ozonoff et al.’s (1991) conclusion was that executive dys-
function is primary in ASD and is dissociable from ToM 
deficits, as the two deficits did not always co-occur. In con-
trast, Harris et al. (2008) reported that individuals with 
ASD who performed poorly on ToM performed poorly on 
EF tasks, and vice versa. In addition, Pellicano (2007) 
reported a significant correlation in an ASD group between 
a ToM composite and several components of EF (planning, 
set-shifting and inhibition), independent of age and IQ. 
Furthermore, and contrary to Ozonoff et al.’s (1991) origi-
nal finding, EF and ToM were dissociable in one direction 
only: impaired ToM with intact EF.
Pellicano’s (2007) findings offer insight into a possible 
developmental relation between ToM and EF in ASD. 
Russell (1996, 1997) suggested that EF is crucial for the 
development of ToM and that deficits in EF may lead to a 
failure to develop mental state understanding in ASD. This 
hypothesis is supported by Pellicano’s (2007) results show-
ing that competent EF could be seen without ToM under-
standing. Examining the same cohort 3 years later, Pellicano 
(2010b) found that EF was longitudinally predictive of 
children’s ToM test performance. A relation in the opposite 
direction was not found. Pellicano’s work suggests that EF 
may be a prerequisite for ToM development and may also 
be critical in determining the developmental trajectory of 
children’s ToM.
These findings do not support the fractionated theory of 
ASD, which predicts that the distinct cognitive impair-
ments should be independent from each other. However, a 
number of points should be noted. First, correlational data 
do not speak directly to causation (Rutter, 2007), and two 
measures may show a relation due to, for example, general 
maturational factors at key developmental stages without 
any direct causal link. Second, cognitive tests are rarely 
‘process pure’, and there is an important distinction to be 
made between correlations due to shared task demands and 
correlations due to related underlying processes. For exam-
ple, some ToM tasks (notably standard false-belief test) 
require inhibition of response based on own belief and may 
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therefore tap some aspects of EF and mental state attribu-
tion. Some EF tasks may also involve social elements; the 
Luria Hand Game (cited by Pellicano, 2007 as tapping 
inhibitory control) may also tap the participant’s ability to 
infer the experimenter’s intentions so that the participant 
can produce the opposite action to the experimenter. 
Ozonoff (1995) showed that performance on a computer-
ised version of the Wisconsin Card Sort Task showed less 
impairment in ASD than the traditional experimenter-pre-
sented version, again suggesting a possible social element 
to at least some standard EF tests. More recently however, 
Williams and Jarrold (2013), using a more closely con-
trolled experimental design, failed to find poorer performance 
on experimenter-administered planning and set-shifting 
tasks compared to computer versions of the same tasks in 
an ASD group.
White (2013) has recently proposed, in place of execu-
tive dysfunction accounts of ASD, a ‘Triple I impair-
ment’: impairment in ‘Inferring Implicit Information’. 
White suggests that impairments on EF tasks are not in 
fact due to core executive dysfunction but instead second-
ary to mentalising difficulties, that is, those with ASD 
have difficulties forming an explicit understanding of the 
experimenter’s expectations of the task, resulting in irreg-
ular behaviour and performance on only those EF (and 
other) tasks where inferring this information is essential. 
It may also be hypothesised that problems in reflecting on 
own mental states (part of the ToM impairment in ASD; 
Williams and Happé, 2009) may have secondary conse-
quences for EF: for example, difficulties in imaginatively 
rehearsing possible future activities may lead to impaired 
planning. While Williams and Jarrold’s (in press) study 
disconfirmed one prediction made by the Triple I hypoth-
esis (better ASD performance on EF tasks when com-
puter- versus experimenter-administered), the authors 
maintain that ToM and EF may be indirectly linked via 
developmental effects of ToM on communication and 
subsequent inner speech.
CC and ToM
The relation between CC and cognitive deficits in ASD has 
been less widely studied. Some studies have found no links 
between tasks measuring CC and ToM (Happé, 1997; 
Pellicano et al., 2006). A local processing bias and poor 
global processing have been observed in children with 
ASD, regardless of whether they pass or fail ToM tasks 
(Happé, 1994, 1997). Burnette et al. (2005) found a link 
between verbal measures of CC and ToM ability, but this 
was no longer significant once IQ was taken into account. 
A similar pattern of results was noted by Pellicano et al. 
(2006) who found that correlations between performance in 
ToM and weak CC measures disappeared once age, verbal 
ability and non-verbal ability were accounted for. Only one 
study has described a relation between individual differ-
ences in ToM and weak CC task performance in ASD 
(Jarrold et al., 2000). These authors concluded that a ToM 
deficit may be the result of an inability to take a global view 
of social situations and a weak drive to integrate social 
information. It should, perhaps, be noted that Happé and 
Booth (2008) have suggested that weak CC may itself 
reflect two separable components that are often confounded 
in tests: increased local processing and decreased global 
processing. This raises the possibility that, for example, 
superior eye for detail is unrelated to ToM, but that reduced 
integration of information in context may have a detrimen-
tal impact on understanding social situations and accurately 
attributing mental states.
There are a number of other theoretical accounts related 
to weak coherence, which posit only superior local pro-
cessing, including Mottron et al.’s (2006) ‘enhanced 
perceptual functioning’ theory and Baron-Cohen’s 
‘empathising-systemising’ hypothesis. The latter is rele-
vant to the present discussion because systemising (the 
drive to discover and understand regular systems) is set in 
contrast to ‘empathising’ (understanding of social and 
emotional signals). In discussion of his model, Baron-
Cohen typically portrays these social and non-social traits 
as orthogonal and independent; however, work from his 
laboratory on the effects of foetal testosterone suggests 
inverse effects on social-communicative functioning and 
visuo-spatial and repetitive ASD traits (Auyeung et al., 
2010). However, the correlation between performance on 
tests of empathising (e.g. Reading the Mind in the Eyes) 
and systemising (e.g. folk physics) has not been widely 
assessed in an ASD sample; Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) did 
report a significant negative correlation in a small sample 
of boys with Asperger syndrome.
CC and EF
Finally, executive dysfunction and weak coherence 
appear to be dissociable (Booth et al., 2003; Pellicano, 
2010b; Pellicano et al., 2006). Pellicano et al. (2006) 
found that good performance on CC measures was related 
to better performance on EF tasks in an ASD group, but 
that correlations were not significant once age and ability 
were co-varied, perhaps in part because the CC measures 
used (e.g. Pattern-Construction Task) tapped visuo-spa-
tial ability along with style. In addition, Booth et al. 
(2003) compared boys with ASD and those with attention 
deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) on a drawing task 
examining both cognitive processing style and planning 
ability. Only boys with ASD were more detail-focused 
than controls, but both ASD and ADHD groups showed 
planning impairments. Furthermore, poor planning abil-
ity did not predict a detail-focused cognitive style. Booth 
and Happé (2010) also report results from a verbal test of 
coherence in the same ASD and ADHD groups. Here 
again, only ASD boys were characterised by detail-focus 
(making more local sentence completions), while both 
ASD and ADHD groups showed response selection defi-
cits on a Go/No-Go task, and performance on the two 
tests was not significantly correlated. Research to date 
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therefore suggests that weak coherence is independent of 
executive dysfunction, in line with the proposals of the 
fractionable triad account of ASD.
Finally, Pellicano (2010a, 2010b) conducted the first 
prospective study to investigate the development of multi-
ple cognitive atypicalities in ASD over a 3-year period. 
Group differences were reported; children with ASD 
showed difficulties in false-belief understanding, higher 
order planning and cognitive flexibility at ages 4–7 and 
7–10 relative to typically developing controls. Principal 
components analysis at Time 1 yielded four factors, with 
ToM, CC and EF measures falling on separate factors – per-
haps supporting in part a fractionable triad view. At Time 2, 
however, only two factors emerged, with the ToM and EF 
tasks loading together and only the CC measures remaining 
distinct. Examining predictors of change over time, 
Pellicano found that change in ToM showed independent 
influence from EF and CC performance, while change in 
EF was not predicted by ToM or CC (over and above Time 
1 EF and general ability measures), nor was change in CC 
performance significantly predicted by ToM or EF meas-
ures. Thus, the pattern of interrelations was partly support-
ive of and partly counter to a fractionable triad view: while 
EF and CC emerged as relatively distinct, ToM and EF 
showed a significant concurrent (at Time 2) and develop-
mental relation. The relation between ToM and EF has also 
been much discussed and researched in the literature on 
typical development (e.g. Hughes and Ensor, 2007) and 
acquired neurological damage (e.g. Aboulafia-Brakha 
et al., 2011), with evidence of strong associations between 
task performance in the two domains. However, given our 
specific focus on ASD, further discussion of this work is 
beyond the scope of the current review.
Prediction (2): relations between 
cognitive accounts and behavioural 
symptoms
The fractionated triad theory of autism suggests that differ-
ent cognitive functions may underlie the distinct symptom 
domains of ASD (Happé and Ronald, 2008). This predicts 
that performance on, for example, ToM tests should relate 
most strongly to social-communicative symptoms, while 
EF tests may correlate best with non-social repetitive 
behaviour, and CC measures may relate specifically to une-
ven cognitive profile, talents and narrow interests. However, 
surprisingly few studies have investigated whether differ-
ent cognitive functions are differentially related to distinct 
parts of the ASD triad of impairments. Of course, the pre-
diction of differential cognition-behaviour links rests on an 
assumption that significant correlations can be found 
between any cognitive tasks and everyday behaviours, 
symptoms or traits. Studies examining these links, and spe-
cifically those relevant to the differential links prediction of 
the fractionable triad hypothesis, are summarised in Table 1 
and briefly reviewed below.
ToM and ASD symptoms
Deficits in social cognition, specifically impaired ToM, are 
hypothesised to underlie the social and communicative 
symptoms that define ASD (see Tager-Flusberg, 1999). A 
number of studies have reported a relation between perfor-
mance on ToM tasks and everyday social abilities in ASD. 
An early study by Frith et al. (1994) found significantly 
better real-life social insight (e.g. ability to keep secrets, 
understand lies) in children with ASD who passed ToM 
tasks compared to those who failed. Four very recent stud-
ies have supported and extended this finding. Lerner et al. 
(2011) found that ToM ability was negatively correlated 
with ASD symptoms and social impairments and that fewer 
ASD symptoms significantly predicted higher ToM scores. 
Ames and White (2011) investigated the relation between 
ADHD-related behaviours in a sample of children with 
ASD and behavioural and cognitive impairments. Poorer 
performance on ToM measures was significantly related to 
social difficulties but not to ADHD-related behaviours. 
Shimoni et al. (2012) found that performance on tasks 
measuring various aspects of ToM was related to social and 
communication impairments in ASD, as measured by the 
Autism Diagnostic Interview–Revised (ADI-R; Lord et al., 
1994). Finally, Bennett et al. (2013) reported a significant 
association between ToM ability in late childhood with 
later communication skills in adolescence (when control-
ling for language ability in childhood).
However, not all studies have found a significant rela-
tion between performance on ToM measures and everyday 
social ability in ASD. For example, Loth et al. (2010) found 
no significant relation between symptoms of ASD and ToM 
ability in a group of boys with ASD. In addition, Bennett 
et al. (2013) found no significant associations between 
ToM ability in late childhood with later social skills in ado-
lescence. Overall, previous findings favour a link between 
ToM and social skills in ASD, but further studies are neces-
sary to understand the somewhat mixed findings.
Executive functions and ASD symptoms
Executive dysfunction has been hypothesised to explain the 
RRBIs observed in individuals with ASD. Difficulties in 
inhibiting inappropriate behaviour, shifting set and generat-
ing appropriate new behaviours have been hypothesised to 
underlie RRBIs (Turner, 1997). Several previous studies 
have investigated RRBIs in ASD in relation to specific 
executive processes. Turner (1995) found that RRBIs were 
most strongly linked to generativity deficits (e.g. verbal flu-
ency) in a sample of young people with ASD. Mosconi 
et al. (2009) reported that impaired inhibition of prepotent 
















Table 1. Published studies assessing cognitive domains in relation to symptom type and severity in autism spectrum disorder (ASD).






55 ASD (9 autism, 30 AS, 16 ASD/PDD-NOS); 
48 M, 7 F, CA 10, VIQ 105, PIQ 94
Prior clinician 
diagnosis
– ToM Battery, Hayling 
Sentence Completion Test 
(to test inhibitory control)
3Di Low ASD-social impairment group > high ASD-social 
impairment group on inhibitory control and ToM tasks (d 
= 0.55).
ToM predicts social interaction in ASD (R2 = 0.08), but not 
in ADHD group
Bennett 
et al. (2013) 
Time 1: 68 HFA; CA 7, IQ > 68, PIQ 86
Time 2: 39 HFA; CA 15
Time 3: 35 HFA; 31 M, 4 F, CA 17
DSM-III-R criteria Time 1: language Time 2: Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes test
VABS Time 2: ToM predicts Time 3 VABS Communication, 
controlling for language, but not Socialisation 
 
Frith et al. 
(1994) 
 
24 autism; 17 M, 7 F, CA 15, MA 7, VIQ 52
15 TD; 5 M, 10 F, CA 4, MA 4, VIQ 93
11 MLD; 7 M, 4 F, CA 9, MA 5, VIQ 60
DSM-III-R criteria – 2 FB tasks (groups divided 
into passers and failures)
VABS ASD ToM-passers > ToM-failures on VABS Communication 
(d = 0.63) and Socialisation (d = 0.54) domain scores. 
 
Lerner et al. 
(2011) 
30 ASD; 24 M, 6 F, CA 14 Prior clinician 
diagnosis plus SCQ 
and SRS
– ToM Inventory SCQ, Social Skills Rating 
System–Parent, SRS
ToM scores × parent-reported social skills correlated (r 
= 0.61), ToM scores × autism-related social impairment 
negatively correlated (SCQ r = −0.55, SRS r = −0.75).
Higher social skills and fewer autistic symptoms predicts 
ToM scores (R2 = 0.66).




20 ASD (HFA or AS); all M, CA 12, FIQ 108, 
VIQ 107, PIQ 107




on CA, VIQ, PIQ
ToM: FB task, Strange Stories Childhood AS Test
 
 
No correlation between ToM or CC tasks and ASD 










25 ASD child; CA 13
 25 ASD child’s mother; CA 42
 25 ASD child’s father; CA 47
28 TD child; CA 14
 28 TD child’s mother; CA 43
 28 TD child’s father; CA 46
ADOS-G Age, education and 
income of parents
ToM: Social Attribution Task Children: ADOS-G, 







Pertinence index positively correlated with ADI-R social 
interaction (r = 0.27) and communication deficits (r = 0.39)
Salience index negatively correlated with ADI-R (r = −0.35) 
and communication deficits (r = 0.34).
ToM Affective and Salience indices correlated with ADOS-G 
(Stereotypic and Limited interest items) (r = 0.51)
White et al. 
(2009) 
45 ASD (8 autism, 25 AS, 12 ASD); 41 M, 4 F, 





Standard ToM battery; 11 FB 
tasks and Penny-Hiding Task, 
Strange Stories
3Di ASD children with poor ToM had more severe social (d 
= 0.83) and communication (d = 0.69) symptoms, but not 
repetitive behaviours27 TD; 21 M, 6 F, CA 9, VIQ 115, PIQ 103  
EF
Akbar et al. 
(2013)




ADI-R, ADOS-G Symptom severity does not predict inhibition, working 
memory or organisation score. Both PIQ and severity of 




14 HFA; PIQ 107
17 SLI; PIQ 99
25 PLI; PIQ 105
18 TD; PIQ 111
SCQ and ADOS-G PIQ Two subtests from Test 
of Everyday Attention 
for Children (to measure 
inhibition)
ADOS, SCQ, Children’s 
Communication 
Checklist  
No correlation between inhibition and symptom measures 
of ASD (rs < 0.14)




61 HFA (31 autism, 22 AS, 5 PDD-NOS); CA 
10, IQ 100
64 TD; CA 12, IQ 111
DSM-IV criteria, 
ADI-R, SCQ
– BRIEF RBS-R, Sensory 
Questionnaire
 
Behaviour regulation correlated with repetitive behaviour (r 
= 0.43), not sensory impairments (r = 0.03)
A diagnosis of ASD, lower age, higher scores on Sensory 
Questionnaire and BRIEF Behaviour Regulation predicts 












Reference Participants (group means) ASD diagnosis Control variables Cognitive tasks Symptom measures Relevant findings (with effect sizes)
D’Cruz 
et al. (2013)
41 ASD (22 autism, 12 PDD-NOS, 7 AS); 34 M, 
7 F, CA 15, FIQ 104, VIQ 102, PIQ 105
DSM-IV-TR, ADOS, 
ADI-R
CA, gender, IQ Probabilistic Reversal 
Learning Task
ADI-R, RBS-R Positive correlation between poor flexible behaviour and 
RBS-R total score (r = 0.34), ADI RRBI score (r = 0.37) and 
stereotyped, repetitive or idiosyncratic behaviour (ADI-R B3 
subscale; r = 0.38).







50 ASD; CA 10 IQ 102
42 TD; CA 11 IQ 112
DSM-IV criteria, 
ADI-R, SRS
CA Generativity tasks: Animals 
Fluency Task, The Use of 
Objects Task





Only correlations between communication impairments and 
animal fluency task scores (r = 0.42–0.46)
No correlation between generativity and repetitive 
behaviours (r < 0.30)
Gilotty et al. 
(2002)
35 ASD (HFA or autism); 30 M, 5 F, CA 10, IQ 
104
DSM-IV criteria – BRIEF VABS BRIEF Initiate and Working Memory subscales negatively 
correlated with Communication (r = −0.48; r = −0.52) and 
Socialisation domains of VABS (r = −0. 64; r = −0.57).
Kenworthy 
et al. (2009)




– BRIEF, Test of Everyday 
Attention for Children, 
Tower of London, Semantic 
Fluency
ADI, ADOS EF tasks predict communication symptoms (semantic fluency: 
E = −0.63; BRIEF: E = 0.30), social interaction symptoms 
(divided attention and working memory: E = −0.44; semantic 
fluency: E = −0.60) and RRBIs (BRIEF: E = 0.38), after 





22 ASD; 5 F, 17 M, CA 8, PIQ 98





CA, gender, PIQ, 
parent education
Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Task, Mazes subtest of 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale 




30-min coded video of 
semi-structured play
 
EF tasks predict motor stereotypies (R2 = 0.33).
Lower EF scores predict higher frequencies and longer 
duration of stereotypies in ASD group only (E ≥ −0.48 ≤ 
−0.26)
Lopez et al. 
(2005)
 
17 ASD; CA 29




CA Delis–Kaplan Executive 
Function Scale, Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Task
ADOS, ADI-R, Gilliam 




Cognitive flexibility, working memory and response 
inhibition correlated with RRBIs (r = 0.63, r = −0.56, r = 
0.58, respectively). Planning and fluency not correlated 
with RRBIs (r = −0.09, r = −0.45, respectively). Together, 
cognitive flexibility, working memory and response inhibition 







17 autism; 10 M, 7 F, CA 5, NVA 12, VA 14
13 DD; CA 4, NVA 12




Autism and DD: 
NVA, CA
Autism and TD: VA
Piagetian A-not-B Error 
Task, Delayed Response 






Social interaction and EF correlated (r = −0.44), in part due 




18 ASD (13 autism, 5 AS); 14 M, 4 F, CA 18, 
VIQ 110, PIQ 107, FIQ 109
DSM-IV criteria, 
ADI-R, ADOS-G
CA, IQ Visually guided Saccade Task ADI-R Impairments in inhibitory control and higher order RRBIs 
positively correlated (r = 0.65), after controlling for age 
(partial r = 0.73) 15 TD; 11 M, 4 F, CA 20, VIQ 110, PIQ 107, 
FIQ 110
 
Reed et al. 
(2013)
 
15 ASD; CA 8, PIQ 71, MA 6




Matched ASD MA 
to TD CA
Card Sort Task Gilliam Autism Rating 
Scale
Perseverative errors correlated to stereotyped behaviours 
(r = 0.69). Perseverative errors not correlated to 
communication difficulties or social interactions (rs < 0.26) 
Teunisse 
et al. (2001)
35 HFA; 26 M, 9 F, CA 19, VIQ 91 DSM-IV criteria – Card Sorting Tests, 
CANTAB ID/ED, Switch-
in-series






No correlations between EF tasks and social measures 
(social IQ r = −0.31, social competence r = −0.03, ASD 
symptoms r = 0.22)
Yerys et al. 
(2009)
 
42 ASD (35 HFA, 7 PDD-NOS); 33 M, 9 F, CA 
10, FIQ 112
84 TD; 65 M, 19 F, CA 10, FIQ 113
DSM-IV-TR criteria 
ADOS-G, ADI-R
– ID/ED ADI-R ID/ED and RRBI domain of ADI-R correlated (r = 0.43, 
FIQ partialled out). ID/ED and social or communication 
domain scores not correlated (social symptoms r = 0.19; 


















Reference Participants (group means) ASD diagnosis Control variables Cognitive tasks Symptom measures Relevant findings (with effect sizes)




19 ASD (15 AS, 2 autism, 1 PDD-NOS; 16 M, 3 
F, CA 11, VIQ 96, PIQ 95
17 OCD; 8 M, 9 F, CA 12, VIQ 94, PIQ 96
18 TD; 6 M, 12 F, CA 12, VIQ 95, PIQ 103
DSM-IV-TR CA, VIQ, PIQ Verbal Fluency Task, Concept 
Generation Task–Child 
Version, Rey Figure, Walk 














Time 1: 31 HFA; 26 M, 5 F, CA 11
 16 TD; CA 11
 17 LD
Time 2 (15–19 months): 23 HFA; 19 M, 4 F, VIQ 
110, PIQ 110
  20 TD (12 TD + 6 LD +2 new LD); 15 M, 5 F, 
CA 11, VIQ 117, PIQ 117




HFA Spectrum Screening 
Questionnaire, Australian 
Scale for AS
No correlations between CC tasks and ASD symptoms  
(no statistics stated)
Chen et al. 
(2009)
29 ASD; 26 M, 3 F, CA 12, IQ 114 Clinical diagnosis, 
ADOS, SCQ
– EFT Childhood Routines 
Inventory, Short Sensory 
Profile
Degree of RRBIs (r = −0.39), but not sensory abnormalities 
(r = −0.02), predict completion time on the EFT
Drake et al. 
(2010)
27 TD; 9 M, 18 F, CA 10 – – Block Design, EFT, Copying 
Task
Childhood AS Test Performance on CC tasks not related to RRBIs (rs < 0.27).
Loth et al. 
(2010)
 
20 ASD (HFA or AS); all M, CA 12, FIQ 108, 
VIQ 107, PIQ 107
18 TD; all M, CA 11, FIQ 109, VIQ 109, PIQ 112
Prior clinical 
diagnosis
CA, VIQ, PIQ EFT, Block Design, Sentence 
Completion Task




et al. (2003) 
21 ASD (19 autism, 2 PDD-NOS); 19 M, 2 F, CA 
5, MA 3, PIQ 95, VIQ 77
21 TD; 16 M, 5 F, CA 5, MA 5, PIQ 105, VIQ 
101
DSM-IV criteria Gender, CA, PIQ Preschool EFT, Differential 
Ability Scales – Pattern 
Construction
ADI-R, ADOS CC predicts ASD group membership (d = 1.86).
 
Russell-
Smith et al. 
(2012) 
80 TD; CA 19, 56 F – Age and gender EFT (group divided by AQ 
‘social skills’ and ‘details/
patterns’ (either high or low)
Autism Spectrum 
Quotient
EFT scores: high social difficulty > low social difficulty  
(d = 0.59).
High details/patterns = low details/patterns (d = 0.17)
South et al. 
(2007)
 
19 ASD; 14 M, 5 F, CA 15, VIQ 115, PIQ 111, 
FIQ 114
18 TD; 11 M, 7 F, VIQ 112, PIQ 113, FIQ 112
DSM-IV criteria, 
ADI-R, ADOS-G
CA, VIQ, PIQ, FIQ EFT, Gestalt closure test ADOS, ADI-R, Repetitive 
Behaviour Interview, 
Yale Special Interests 
Interview 




35 HFA; 26 M, 9 F, CA 19, VIQ 91 DSM-IV criteria Children’s EFT, EFT, 
California Verbal Learning 
Test-Semantic and Serial 
Gradient, Visual Object 










No correlations between CC tasks and social measures 
(social IQ r = 0.00, social competence r = 0.16, autistic 




45 ASD; 41 M, 4 F, CA 9, VIQ 111, PIQ 98




Gender, CA, VIQ, 
PIQ

























– 5 EF tasks; Word Span, Block 
Span, Day–Night, Knock-Tap, 
Tower
ADOS ToM correlated with communication (r = −0.64), but 
not social symptoms or RRBIs when non-verbal MA and 
language controlled for (rs < 0.34). Language (R2 = 0.33), 
ToM ability (R2 = 0.28) and Tower score (R2 = 0.05) predict 
communication symptoms. Neither ToM nor EF accounted 








40 ASD (30 autism, 10 PDD-NOS); 35 M, 5 F, 
CA 5.6, VIQ 101, PIQ 114









Ground task, Developmental 
Test of Visual–Motor 
Integration
ADI-R All cognitive tasks failed to correlate with either ADI-R total 
or domain scores.
EFT and social domain (at 4–5 years) negatively correlated 
(r = 0.41)
ToM: 6 first-order FB tasks, 2 
second-order FB tasks
EF: Luria Hand Game, Mazes 








Time 1: 45 ASD; 40 M, 5 F, CA 5.6, VIQ 97, 
PIQ 113 
45 TD; 37 M, 8 F, CA 5.4, VIQ 101, PIQ 116
Time 2: (3 years) 37 ASD; 33 M, 4 F, CA 8.4, 
VIQ 94, PIQ 104 
31 TD; 25 M, 6 F, CA 8.2, VIQ 100, PIQ 107
DSM-IV criteria, 
Time 1 with ADI-R, 
Time 2 with 
ADOS-G
Age, VIQ, PIQ (at 
Time 1)
Time 1: ToM: 2 first-order 
FB tasks, 1 second-order 
FB task EF: Teddy-bear 
set-shifting task, Luria Hand 
Game, Mazes task CC: EFT, 
Pattern-Construction task, 
Figure-Ground task
Time 2: ADOS-G, 
Repetitive Behaviour 
Questionnaire
ToM negatively correlated with social communication  
(r = −0.42). EF negatively correlated with social 
communication and RRBIs (both r = 0.42). CC not 
correlated (r < 0.21)
EF predicts symptom severity (ADOS; R2 = 0.16) and 
repetitive behaviours (R2 = 0.15)
ADI-R: Autism Diagnostic Interview–Revised; ADOS-G: Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule–Generic; AS: Asperger syndrome; E: standardised regression coefficient; BRIEF: Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Functioning; 
CA: chronological age in years; CANTAB: Cambridge Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Battery; CC: central coherence; d: Cohen’s d; DD: developmental delay; 3Di: Developmental, Dimensional and Diagnostic Interview; 
DLD: developmental language disorder; DSM: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; EF: executive function; EFT: Embedded Figures test; F: females; FB: false-belief; FIQ: full-scale intelligence quotient; HFA: high-
functioning autism; ICD-10: International Classification of Diseases–Tenth Revision; ID/ED: Intradimensional/Extradimensional shift; LD: learning disability; M: males; MA: mental age in years, MLD: moderate learning difficulties; NVA: 
non-verbal ability; OCD: obsessive compulsive disorder; PDD-NOS: pervasive developmental disorder–not otherwise specified; PIQ: performance intelligence quotient; PLI: pragmatic language impairment; r: correlation coefficient; 
R2: coefficient of determination; RBS-R: Repetitive Behaviour Scale–Revised; RRBIs: restricted and repetitive behaviours and interests; SCQ: Social Communication Questionnaire; SLI: specific language impairment; SRS: Social 
Responsiveness Scale; TD: typically developing, ToM: Theory of Mind; VA: verbal ability; VABS: Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales; VIQ: verbal intelligence quotient.
Cohen’s d, Pearson’s correlation coefficient r and R2 are reported to convey effect sizes. Small, medium and large effects for d are considered as 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8, respectively, and for r, the effects are considered as 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5, 
respectively (Cohen, 1969). Small, medium and large effects for R2 are considered as 0.01, 0.09 and 0.25, respectively (Cohen, 1988). In the ‘Participants’ column, participant characteristics for ASD groups are reported first, followed 
by participant characteristics for any comparison groups. To group studies by cognitive domain, some articles appear more than once.
Table 1. (Continued)
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repetitive behaviours (e.g. compulsions) in ASD. 
Furthermore, inhibitory control was unrelated to social and 
communication symptoms, or sensorimotor behaviours. 
The same pattern was found for the EF domain of set-shift-
ing; Yerys et al. (2009) reported a significant correlation 
between set-shifting difficulties and repetitive behaviour 
(but not social or communicative symptoms) in ASD. South 
et al. (2007) also found support for a link between cogni-
tive flexibility and repetitive behaviours in children with 
ASD. In addition, behavioural flexibility has been recently 
reported to be related to RRBI behaviours but not to social 
or communication symptoms, in both high- and low-func-
tioning ASD (D’Cruz et al., 2013; Reed et al., 2013). 
Taking a more comprehensive view of EF, Lopez et al. 
(2005) noted that some specific executive processes (cogni-
tive flexibility, working memory and response inhibition) 
were highly related to RRBIs, whereas other executive pro-
cesses (planning and fluency) were not significantly corre-
lated with RRBIs in adults with ASD.
Just as ‘EF’ is an umbrella term covering many dissocia-
ble components, the RRBI domain of ASD is a varied set. 
For example, Szatmari et al. (2006) found that RRBIs, as 
measured by the ADI-R, loaded onto two factors: insistence 
on sameness versus repetitive sensory and motor behav-
iours. It may be important to distinguish which aspects of 
RRBIs are correlated with distinct domains of EF. LeMonda 
et al. (2012) measured various aspects of EF in children 
with ASD and developmental language disorders. Lower 
EF scores predicted higher incidences and longer durations 
of motor stereotypies (e.g. hand flapping, rocking) in ASD 
only, when controlling for age, gender and parental educa-
tion. On the contrary, Boyd et al. (2009) found that EF cor-
related with RRBIs but not with sensory abnormalities.
Not all studies have documented a significant relation 
between EF and RRBIs. Zandt et al. (2009) assessed sev-
eral executive processes and RRBIs in individuals with 
obsessive compulsive disorder and ASD. The only sig-
nificant relation uncovered was between generativity and 
obsessions in the ASD group. Dichter et al. (2009) also 
found no relation between generativity ability and sever-
ity of RRBIs, nor with subscales of higher or lower order 
repetitive behaviours. In contrast, they found that impaired 
generativity was related to communication impairments. 
In a different domain of EF, Bishop and Norbury (2005) 
did not find an association between inhibition and any of 
the three symptom domains of ASD. Failure to find a sig-
nificant relation between executive processes and spe-
cific symptoms of ASD may in some cases reflect limited 
sample size and hence statistical power (e.g. Teunisse 
et al., 2001). In addition, there is currently no single task 
or battery of tasks to cover comprehensively all aspects 
of EF, and different findings may reflect different task or 
domain selection (see, for example, White’s division of 
EF tasks according to implicit ToM demands, discussed 
above).
While executive dysfunction has been hypothesised to 
explain RRBIs in ASD, it may also be relevant to everyday 
social interaction. Social interactions likely tax many 
aspects of EF, such as initiation of social approach, flexibil-
ity in social response, attention to social cues such as facial 
expressions, inhibition of socially inappropriate behaviour 
and keeping social networks or different individuals’ men-
tal states in working memory. In support of this, a link 
between EF and social-communication skills has been 
described in young children with ASD (McEvoy et al., 
1993). A more comprehensive study was undertaken by 
Kenworthy et al. (2009) to investigate the link between EF 
and the three symptom domains of ASD. A composite of 
scores from the ADI-R and the Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) was used 
to characterise the three symptom domains, and perfor-
mance in multiple aspects of EF was examined. Correlation 
and regression analyses indicated that semantic fluency and 
divided attention were related to social symptoms, seman-
tic fluency was related to communication symptoms and 
cognitive flexibility was related to RRBIs, after accounting 
for verbal ability and age. This study shows the potential 
for the executive dysfunction account to expand beyond 
explaining RRBIs to include social and communication 
symptoms. The applicability of these results to everyday 
adaptive behaviour has been explored by Gilotty et al. 
(2002); initiation of behaviour and working memory were 
found to be related to impairments in social interaction and 
communication. Thus, some specific elements of EF may 
have a special relation with social and communication 
impairments in ASD.
CC and ASD symptoms
The weak CC theory of ASD, describing detail-focus and 
difficulty integrating information in context for meaning 
(Frith, 1989), was proposed to explain ‘insistence on same-
ness’, narrow interests, uneven cognitive profile and per-
haps sensory abnormalities and savant skills (Happé and 
Vital, 2009). However, as detailed below, studies that have 
investigated the association between a detailed-processing 
style and the symptoms of ASD have produced mixed 
results.
Chen et al. (2009) found a link between a detail-focused 
processing style in the visual domain and degree of repeti-
tive behaviour in children with ASD. However, there was 
no relation between detail-focused processing and sensory 
processing abnormalities. They concluded that sensory pro-
cessing is a lower level process and so cannot be directly 
compared to performance on higher level CC tasks. Loth 
et al. (2008) used sensitivity to context-appropriateness in a 
change blindness paradigm to tap CC and found a moderate 
but only marginally significant relation (r = −0.49) between 
ADOS RRBI scores and differences in change detection as 
a function of context in an ASD sample. Other studies have 
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found no relation between several measures of repetitive 
behaviours and CC measures in both children with ASD 
(South et al., 2007) and typically developing children 
(Drake et al., 2010). In general, there is a surprising paucity 
of studies, considering the theoretical appeal of the weak 
CC account in explaining restricted and repetitive behav-
iours in ASD – perhaps reflecting the relative lack of 
research on non-social (compared to social/communica-
tive) aspects of ASD.
Happé and Frith (2006) have specifically limited the 
explanatory scope of the weak CC account to the non-social 
features of ASD. However, detail-focus may also have inter-
esting implications for social and communicative functioning 
in ASD (e.g. Noens and van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2005, 2008). 
Social interactions involve the integration of discrete cues in 
context to understand social situations. For example, face-
processing and (context-dependent) communication may 
involve the integration of local details (e.g. facial features) in 
context. An association between detailed-processing bias and 
social impairments in ‘neurotypical’ undergraduates has been 
reported (Russell-Smith et al., 2012). However, weak coher-
ence has been reported to be unrelated to several measures of 
social symptoms in ASD samples (Burnette et al., 2005; 
Teunisse et al., 2001). For example, Morgan et al. (2003) 
found no relation between measures of CC and social or com-
municative skills (e.g. joint attention and pretend play) in 
children with ASD aged 3–5 years.
ToM, EF and CC in relation to ASD 
symptoms
Only a handful of studies have considered multiple cogni-
tive deficits in relation to the behavioural symptoms of 
ASD. For example, among a sample of pupils receiving 
extra support with learning, Best et al. (2008) found that 
ToM, weak CC and EF all contributed significantly and 
independently to the prediction of behavioural indicators 
of ASD (measured by the Social Communication 
Questionnaire). Only three studies have specifically inves-
tigated the relation between test performance in all these 
cognitive tasks and the symptom domains in individuals 
with ASD. In Joseph and Tager-Flusberg’s (2004) study, 
ADOS was used to measure symptom severity in children 
with ASD, and ToM and EF tests were administered. 
Limited relations were found between the two cognitive 
tasks and symptom severity in ASD, and relations could be 
largely accounted for by language ability. However, ToM 
ability and higher level EF were significantly related to the 
severity of communication symptoms in ASD, while recip-
rocal social interaction and RRBIs were relatively inde-
pendent. In addition, in Pellicano et al.’s (2006) study, 
parents with children of ASD completed the ADI-R as a 
measure of symptom severity and were administered a sim-
ilar battery of tasks to measure CC, ToM and EF. Contrary 
to Joseph and Tager-Flusberg’s (2004) findings and their 
own predictions, the three cognitive profiles failed to cor-
relate with any of the three symptom domains of ASD.
Pellicano (2013) examined whether early cognitive 
skills could predict later behavioural symptoms of ASD 
as measured by the ADOS and Repetitive Behaviour 
Questionnaire at a 3-year follow-up. ToM was negatively 
associated with social-communication skills and EF was 
strongly associated with both social-communication skills 
and repetitive behaviours. Specifically, early EF, not ToM 
ability, predicted the degree of social-communication 
impairment and repetitive behaviours, thus elucidating the 
important role of EF in influencing the behavioural symp-
toms of ASD. This very recent study conflicts with the frac-
tionable triad approach as specific cognitive functions were 
not found to be uniquely associated with distinct ASD 
symptoms. Instead, Pellicano has suggested that there is 
unlikely to be one-to-one mapping between cognition and 
behaviour and that different environmental interactions 
may affect the way in which cognition influences behav-
iour, and vice versa.
Towards a multifaceted cognitive 
account of ASD: questions and 
future directions
Single cognitive deficit models of ASD have attempted to 
reduce the varied behavioural symptoms of the condition to 
a single underlying cognitive deficit. These single deficit 
models predict strong intercorrelation between perfor-
mance on tests of ToM, EF and CC. The present review of 
the existing evidence suggests significant relations between 
ToM and EF, with some evidence of independence of CC 
from these abilities. The evidence on relations between 
cognitive test performance and real-life behaviour or symp-
toms is patchier, and it is interesting to speculate why test-
symptom correlations are often non-significant. Clearly, 
one of the factors that interposes between individuals’ 
underlying cognitive deficits or style and their behaviour or 
symptoms is their background of compensatory skills. The 
pattern of symptoms will reflect both the degree of impair-
ment or cognitive style atypicality and the alternative 
resources and abilities that the individual can bring to bear 
in order to compensate for, circumvent or alleviate those 
difficulties. While these will include commonly measured 
factors such as IQ and language abilities, they may also 
reflect differences in environment, intervention, memory or 
attention. Johnson (2012) has proposed differences in EF as 
particularly important in compensatory skills. This might 
provide one explanation for the association found between 
ToM and EF in the work reviewed above. Work is needed 
to disentangle the effects of compensation, perhaps by con-
trasting implicit (e.g. ‘anticipatory gaze’, see Senju et al., 
2009) and explicit ToM task performance in relation to EF 
abilities in ASD.
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Among other areas requiring further research is the 
examination of developmental effects (e.g. Pellicano, 
2013). What might we hypothesise about the relative frac-
tionation of the triad across development? On the one hand, 
even primarily distinct abilities or traits might be hypothe-
sised to become more intercorrelated with age, due to 
downstream effects. For example, even if reduced global 
integrative processing and ToM have independent origins, a 
child’s tendency to interpret stimuli in a context-independ-
ent fashion might have developmental effects on their 
social skills; interaction might be sensitive to mental states 
but not to different contexts. Similarly, a child with poor 
inhibitory skills might be poorly tolerated by peers, have 
reduced social learning opportunities and develop less 
accurate social insight. On this view, studies with younger 
age groups will show clearer fractionation of triad domains 
than studies with older groups.
However, the opposite hypothesis might also be proposed. 
Neuro-constructivist theories, and accounts of brain develop-
ment postulating ‘interactive specialisation’, might suggest 
greater definition (‘modularisation’; D’Souza and Karmiloff-
Smith, 2011) of many cognitive abilities with age. Patterns of 
brain activation during some cognitive tasks become more 
specialised and focal with age, and one might therefore pre-
dict greater differentiation of skills and cognitive functions 
with increasing age. Further longitudinal studies are needed 
to test which of these two predictions is correct.
Previous studies have used correlational analyses to 
assess the degree to which cognitive deficits and behav-
ioural symptoms are associated (e.g. Joseph and Tager-
Flusberg, 2004; Pellicano, 2013; Pellicano et al., 2006). 
However, these types of analyses cannot provide evidence 
of a direction of causality. Confirmatory factor analysis 
may be useful in assessing the underlying structure of the 
behavioural symptoms. Path analysis could be implemented 
to assess the degree of relation between cognitive processes 
and behaviour. More complex statistical methods could 
also be implemented to provide a more parsimonious 
approach, such as latent class analysis and factor-mixture 
modelling. These statistical techniques have the potential to 
provide additional information about cognitive and behav-
ioural subtypes of ASD. For example, Georgiades et al. 
(2013) used factor-mixture modelling to suggest that the 
two ASD symptom domains of social-communicative 
impairments and RRBIs may be independent. The differing 
symptom profiles of severity suggested support for the 
existence of three homogeneous subgroups of ASD. 
Hypothetically, differing cognitive deficits may underlie 
the symptom profiles of these three subgroups of ASD. 
Additional analyses, such as latent growth modelling, could 
also be used to explore cognitive functioning across devel-
opment and its altering relations with ASD symptoms using 
a longitudinal framework. These analyses could help test 
the multiple cognitive deficit model or fractionated triad 
theory of ASD.
The present review has been concerned with studies of 
ASD, but clearly of relevance to the fractionated triad 
account is the existence of other clinical groups in which defi-
cits in just ToM, EF or CC can be documented (see Happé and 
Ronald, 2008 for discussion). The new DSM-5 includes a new 
category of Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder, 
aimed in part at capturing those individuals who may have 
social and communication problems without RRBIs. It will 
be interesting and important to see how this influences 
research and to discover whether ToM, EF and/or CC are 
affected in such individuals.
Future studies using, for example, intervention 
approaches as a window into causal relations will be val-
uable. A pilot study by Fisher and Happé (2005) sug-
gested that training studies may be informative; these 
authors found that training set-shifting improved ToM 
skills but not vice versa – although the latter comparison 
was limited by non-significant gains in generalised set-
shifting ability.
If, as the fractionated triad account suggests, ASD is 
caused by different genes, neural patterns and cognitive 
components that influence distinct behavioural symptoms, 
then it is possible that intervention can target particular 
aspects of ASD while leaving other aspects valued by ASD 
self-advocates untouched. Understanding the fractionable 
or monolithic cognitive underpinnings of the autism pheno-
type has the potential to be both theoretically and practi-
cally informative.
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